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IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF UTAH

FLORENCE GILLMOR,
Plaintiff-Respondent,
vs.

EDWARD LESLIE GILLMOR,

)
)
)
)
)
)
)
)
)

Case No. 16023

Defendant-Appellant.
____________________________)

APPELLANT'S BRIEF
STATEMENT OF KIND OF CASE
This is a suit for a declaratory judgment relating to
options to renew leases.

DISPOSITION IN LOWER COURT
The trial court made and entered a summary judgment
declaring that certain leases of land to appellant will terminate
on December 31, 1978.

RELIEF SOUGHT ON APPEAL
Appellant seeks an order reversing the judgment of the
trial court and remanding the case for a full trial on the merits.
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STATEMENT OF FACTS
The plaintiff is the owner of an undivided one-half
interest and the defendant is the owner of an undivided onefourth interest in some 32,000 acres of land located in several
counties in Utah.

In 1969 one Edward L. Gillmor, the father of

the plaintiff, leased to the defendant and to one Stephen T.
Gillmor, his undivided one-half interest in some 7,192 acres of
land in Salt Lake County by a separate written lease, and similarly
leased to the defendant some 17,395 acres in Summit County and
some 6,753 acres in Tooele County.

The leases mentioned above

are attached to the Complaint as Exhibits C, D and E (R 45-61).
This lease relates only to the Summit and Tooele Counties property.
The term of each lease is 10 years with the following
option to renew:
"THE LESSEES have the option to extend this lease
for a period of two years_ upon the expiration of
this lease, provided the ownership of this property
is vested in the present Lessor."
The complaint, insofar as it is pertinent here, alleges
that Stephen T. Gillmor assigned to the defendant his interest in
the lease on or about September 18, 1972; that each lease terminates on November 15, 1978, subject to certain exceptions contained in the lease; that notices of termination of the leases
on November 15, 1978, were given to the defendant in 1974 and
1976; that the present Lessor referred to in the leases is Edward
L. Gillmor and that he died on or about January 8, 1970; and
that the defendant may not exercise the extension option quoted
above because the ownership of the leased land is no longer vested
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.
Machine-generated-2OCR, may contain errors.

in Edward L. Gillmor (R. 3).

See amendment to the complaint

correcting the name of Edward L. Gillmor to Edward Lincoln
Gillmor (R 65, 66).
It is stated in the Salt Lake County lease that
Florence Gillmor is the daughter of the Lessor, Edward Lincoln
Gillmor (R. 49)
The answer to the complaint denies that the leases
terminate on November 14, 1978; denies for lack of information that
the plaintiff is the successor to Edward Lincoln Gillmor; denies
that the

defendant may not exercise the option for renewal and

denies that " ... the defendant's interest in all three leases is
cancelled and terminated effective November 15, 1978 .... " (R. 67,68).
The plaintiff moved" ... the court for su=ary judgment
on her complaint herein ... " basing it upon the pleadings and
upon a memorandum of points and authorities to be submitted.
No grounds for the motion are stated (R. 69) .
Briefs were filed and the trial court made and entered
a summary judgment stating that as a matter of law the defendant
has no right to extend his interest in the Summit County and
Tooele County leases and that they shall expire on December 31,
1978.

The motion was denied as to the Salt Lake County lease.

(R. 136, 137).
This appeal was taken from the summary judgment granting
the motion as to the two leases mentioned.
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ARGUMENT
I

THERE ARE WELL RECOGNIZED RESTRICTIONS
TO THE GRANTING OF MOTIONS FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT.
This is a suit for a declaratory judgment and although
the authority of the court to grant relief is broad there are
certain well-recognized restrictions:
a.

There must be an existing controversy between
parties having adverse legal interests.
op~nions

b.

Advisory

cannot be given.

c.

A judgment should not be given when there
are ongoing activities which may change the
factual situation.

These will be discussed in the order stated.
The law is well summarized in the case of Norvell vs.
Sangre de Cristo Development Co., USCA lOth Circuit, 519 F2d, 370
at page 378.

We quote:

"We cannot render advisory opinions on unknown
facts. Christian Echoes National Ministry, Inc.
v. United States, 404 F.2d 1066 (lOth C~r. 1968);
Oklahoma City, Oklahoma v. Dulick, supra.

Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
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"~inally, we hold that declaratory judgments
are.Lmproper when, as here, ongoing activity may
radLcally change the factual situation. In Mechling
Barge Lines v. United States, 368 U.S. 324, 82 s.Ct.
337, .7 L.Ed.2d 317 (1961), the Supreme Court, in
holdLng that declaratory judgment is a remedy
committed to judicial discretion, held, inter alia:

'We think that sound discretion withholds the remedy where it appears that a
challenged 'continuing practice' is, at
th7 moment adjudication is sought, undergoLng significant modification so that its
ultimate form cannot be confidently predicted.'
368 U.S. 324 at 331, 82 S.Ct. 337 at 341. "'
"An option to renew a lease amounts to
no more than a covenant to grant an additional
term. It is a mere continuing offer not binding
until accepted."
Thompson on Real Property, Vol. 3, Section 1119, p. 421.
See also Majer v. Layfmen, (NJ) 53 Atl 2d 187
Cincinelli v. Iwasaki (Cal) 338 P2d 1005, 1010.
Unless and until the lessee exercises the option, the
"continuing offer" referred to in Thompson is not accepted and there
is nothing for the court to construe.

There is no actual contro-

versy and the plaintiff is simply asking the court for legal
advice which the court cannot give.
Also, this is a case where there are ongoing facts of
the type mentioned in the Norvell case, supra.

The plaintiff has

attached to the complaint voluminous findings of fact, conclusions
of law and a judgment in the partition suit involving the leased
property now on appeal.

The case is on appeal and in view of

the silence of the lease as to the effect thereon of partition,
we submit that the suit and appeal are ongoing facts which should
be considered under the cases cited.

In this case, the factual

Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
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situation of the parties may, as a result of the judgment and appeal,
be entirely changed at the end of the term and when the option is
exercised.

II

A COVENANT TO RENEW A LEASE RUNS WITH THE LAND.
An option to renew a lease has sometimes been considered

to be a condition and sometimes to be a covenant.
It is stated in Buffalo Ins. Co. v. Bommarito, 42 F2d, 53:
"A general rule of construction is that in
case of doubt as to whether a provision in a
lease or an agreement to extend a lease is a
covenant or condition, it is to be construed
as a covenant. "
A covenant to extend a lease runs with the land and
in case the lessor or one of the lessors dies, as in this case,
it is enforceable against those who succeed to the title of the
deceased.
O'Connor v. Chiascione (Conn.) 33 Atl. 2d 336.
Dana v. Dana, 157 N.E. 623
Judkins v. Charette, (Mass.) 151 N.E. 81
Cincinelli v. Iwasaki, (Cal.) 338 P2d 1005.
51C C.J.S. Page 180
The law is that a covenant to extend or renew a lease
is not personal unless the instrument makes it so, is well
expressed in the case of Taylor v. King Cole Theaters, 183 Va.
117,

31 S.E. 2d 260:
"In addition to the fact that the original
lessors .had solemnly covenanted not to enter
into a new lease with the appellants or others,
the general law is that covenants to renew a
lease are not personal, in the absence of an
agreement making them so, but run with the
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
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land. The legal successors of the lessor and
the lessee are entitled to the benefits and
ar~ burdened with the duties and obligations
wh~ch such covenants confer and impose on the
original parties."

III

THERE ARE GENUINE ISSUES OF MATERIAL FACTS.
The courts have held almost uniformly that where there
is a question of the intentions of the parties to a written instrument which cannot be determined with certainty from the instrument
itself, a motion for a summary judgment should be denied.

The

reasoning behind this rule is that any inqui:?::->' in :o surrounding
circumstances to determine intention involves questions of
material fact.
The rule is well stated in the case of Ackerman v.
Mohawk Cabinet Co., 322 NYS 2d 396:
"Where the intent of the parties is not
unequivocally clear, intent must be gleaned
from sense in which the words were used,
relations of parties, resolution of conflicting interests, if any, surrounding circumstances;
this inquiry involves both questions of law and
fact and is not properly dealt with by summary
judgment." (emphasis added)
In the case of Fulton v. Clark, (Mont.) 538 P.2d 1371,
1374, the court said:
"Summary judgment is usually ~napprop:iate
where the intent of the contract~ng part~es
is an important consideration."
We quote from the California case of Lynch v. Spilman,
431 P.2d 636, 646:
" ... In Walsh v. \<lalsh, (1941) , 18 Cal. 2d 439,
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
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here."
In this case there is no evidence of facts or circumstances surrounding the execution of the lease and the court
should not permit the drastic procedure of summary judgment to be
substituted

for a trial.

The limitations on the application of Rule 56(c) U.R.C.P.
are well pointed out in the case of Judkins v. Toone, 27 Utah 2d
17, 492 P.2d 980 as follows:
"We recognize and commend the usefulness of
Rule 56(c), U.R.C.P., which authorizes the granting
of a summary judgment under the circumstances provided
in the rule:
'if the pleadings, depositions, and
admissions on file, together with the affidavits,
if any, show that there is no genuine issue as to any
material fact and that the moving party is entitled to
a judgment as a matter of law.' If this condition
is met the granting of the summary judgment has the
salutary purpose of eliminating the time, trouble
and expense of a trial, when upon the best showing
a party could possibly make, he nevertheless would
not.be entitled to prevail.
"However, as this court observed in the case of
Dupler v. Yates:
'Rule-56 U.R.C.P. is not intended to
provide a substitute for the regular trial
of cases in which there are disputed issues
of fact upon which the outcome of the litigation depends. And it should be invoked with
caution to the end that litigants may be
afforded a trial where there exists between
them a bona fide dispute of material fact.'
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
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"This doctrine of law has been reaffirmed many
times by this court. A good example is its expression in the case of Frederick May & Company
v. Dunn:
'To sustain a summary judgment, the
pleadings, evidence, admissions ... must
show that there is no genuine issue of
material fact, and that the winner is
entitled to a judgment as a matter of.
law. Such showing must preclude, as a
matter of law, all reasonable possibility
that the loser could win if given a trial.'"

IV
THE COMPLICATIONS OF COTENANCY SHOULD
HAVE BEEN CONSIDERED BY THE COURT
It will be noted that the leases involved in this appeal
cover only an undivided one-half interest in the land described
and as stated in the findings of fact in the partition suit
attached to the complaint (Exhibit B, R. 17) that the defendant
owns an undivided one-fourth interest and that Charles F. Gillmor
owns an undivided one-fourth interest.

They are tenants in common.

The law is that each tenant in common owns an undivided
fraction in the whole, being entitled to an interest in every inch
of the property.

86 C.J.S. p. 362.

A tenant in common may lease his undivided interest and
the lessee, as such, would become a tenant in common with the
other cotenants.

86 C.J.S. P.523.

"A tenant in common may, without the consent of
his cotenants, convey or dispose of his undivided
interest in the common property as long as he does
not prejudice the rights of his cotenants in the
premises." 86 C.J.S. 531.
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There is nothing in the record before the court as to
the status of the one-fourth interest in the land owned by Charles
F. Gillmor.

Exhibit B to the complaint (R. pp. 13-43) indicates

the magnitude, great differences, and complications inherent in
the use of the leased land.

We believe, and earnestly urge that

a court considering whether the inheritance of the interest of
Edward L. Gillmor by his daughter constituted a change of ownership within the meaning of the renewal provision which would deny
the defendant his option to renew under the facts and circumstances
disclosed by the pleadings, including Exhibit B.
If, for example, the court should hold that the renewal
option was not effective in Tooele, and Summit Counties as to
plaintiff's one-half interest, the defendant would still be in
possession of "every inch of the property" by virtue of his
status of cotenant.

The plaintiff would be entitled under the law

to an equal right to every square inch.

From a practical standpoint

the end result of the granting of summary judgment would be total
confusion.
The fact that the plaintiff owns a one-half interest and
the defendant owns a one-fourth interest does not change the
basic law that each has an interest in each inch with equal rights
of possession.
The rule has been stated as follows in 86 C.J.S. P. 363:
"Tenants in corranon are seized 'per my et per tout'
although it has also been said that tenants in common
are seized 'per my' and not 'per tout'. Each tenant
has been held to own an undivided fraction, and each
is entitled before severance to an interest in every
inch of the soil; but no one of them is entitled to
the exclusive possession of any particular part of
the land, each being entitled to occupy the whole in
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
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-~
common with the others or to receive his share of
the rents and profits and the undivided interest of a
tenant in common has been held to be intangible and
incorporeal."
In view of the obvious complications of ownership and
possession, the whole factual situation of the parties should
have been considered. The trial court erred in granting the motion
for summary judgment.

v
OPTIONS TO RENEW A LEASE ARE CONSTRUED
MOST STRONGLY AGAINST THE LESSOR.
The law is well settled that options to renew or extend
the term of a lease are construed most strongly against the lessor
and in favor of the lessee.
Thompson on Real Property, 1959 Replacement
Vol. 3, Section 1119, page 421.
Podol vs. Jacobs, 65 Ariz. 50, 173 P2d 758.
McAulay vs. Jones, 110 Cal. App. 2d 302, 242 P2 650.

CONCLUSION
It is respectfully submitted that the order of the trial
court granting the plaintiff's motion for a summary judgment should
be reversed.

Respectfully Submitted,

E. J:SEN
SKEEN AND SKEEN
536 East Fourth South
Salt provided
Lake byCity,
Utah
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